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"The conservative tide is on the wane. We must not let Europe be bogged down in an 
excessive neo-liberal, monetarist model." 
      --Lionel  Jospin,  at  the  Congress  of   
      the  Party  of  European  Socialists, 
      M a l m o ,   S w e d e n
2 
 
“The centre-left parties now have a majority in Europe, giving us a great 
opportunity. But we will quickly be rejected if we go back to our old ways. We must 
modernise or die.” 
--Tony Blair, at the same conference
3 
 
 
1. Assumptions and Argument 
  This chapter rests on three basic assumptions. The first assumption, following Simon 
Hix (1994), is that the politics of the European Union can be theorized in terms of a 
left-right cleavage, as well as the more familiar cleavage between national independence and 
European integration. As Hix points out, students of international relations have 
traditionally analyzed the main events (and indeed the minutiae) of EU history in terms of 
whether these events increased or decreased the level of supranational integration in the EU. 
Yet such an emphasis on integration per se tells us little or nothing about the implications of 
European integration for domestic politics, including the traditional left-right conflict 
between free- 
                                                           
1 The author is grateful to Kathleen McNamara, Jo Shaw, Antje Wiener and Karlheinz Neunreither for helpful 
comments on earlier drafts of this chapter, and to the World Affairs and the Global Economy (WAGE) 
program of the University of Wisconsin-Madison for research support.  
2 Quoted in Conradi 1997. 
3 Quoted in Sherman 1997. 
  2market neoliberals and more interventionist Christian or social democrats. Indeed, Hix and 
Lord (1997) argue that the EU political system is a two-dimensional political space, with an 
“integration” dimension and a “left-right” dimension, neither reducible to the other; and they 
examine the nature of partisan contestation in such a two-dimensional space. 
  The second assumption of the chapter, following Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, is 
that, in the context of Hix’s two-dimensional space, the political debate in the European 
Union today can be theorized as a right-left struggle between neoliberals on the one hand 
and proponents of what they call “regulated capitalism” on the other. In their words, 
The neoliberal project attempts to insulate markets from political interference by 
combining European-wide market integration with the fragmentation of authority 
among national governments. The neoliberal project rejects democratic institutions 
at the European level capable of regulating the market, but seeks instead to generate 
competition among national governments in providing regulatory climates that 
mobile factors find attractive (Hooghe and Marks 1997, p. 3). 
 
By contrast, 
 
The project for regulated capitalism proposes a variety of market-enhancing and 
market-supporting legislation to create a social democratic dimension to European 
governance. This project attempts to deepen the European Union and increase its 
capacity for regulation, by among other things, upgrading the European Parliament, 
promoting the mobilization of particular social groups, and reforming institutions to 
make legislation easier (i.e. by introducing qualified majority rule in the Council of 
Ministers) (Ibid, p. 3). 
 
“These projects,” according to Marks and Hooghe, “are coherent, comprehensive packages 
of institutional reforms around which broad coalitions of political actors at European, 
national, and subnational levels have formed” (ibid., p. 3). 
  There are, to be sure, problems with Hooghe and Marks’ classification scheme, 
which is both too narrow and too broad. The scheme is too narrow in the sense that both the 
neoliberal and regulated-capitalism projects focus almost exclusively on “first pillar” 
  3economic issues, leaving out a number of politically important aspects of EU politics, such 
as the second and third pillars (Common Foreign and Security Policy, Justice and Home 
Affairs), which have left-right political implications in the member states as well as at the 
EU level. Yet, I would argue, the concept of regulated capitalism is also too broad, in that it 
overestimates the coherence of the project and its supporting coalitions, and underestimates 
the number of cleavages cutting across the two projects. More specifically, I will argue 
below that the supporting coalition for the project for regulated capitalism can be further 
subdivided into a coalition of left and center-left parties on the one hand, and a separate 
“cohesion” coalition of poor states (regardless of political coloration) on the other hand. The 
former group, I will suggest, won some significant victories in Amsterdam; the latter did 
not. Furthermore, as we shall see, the European left was itself divided at Amsterdam about 
the precise nature of its European “project,” which was not as self-evident as the ideal type 
of regulated capitalism might suggest. Nevertheless, despite these weaknesses, Hooghe and 
Marks’ categories are a useful heuristic device with which to analyze the left-right 
implications of European integration in general and EU treaties in particular, and this 
chapter will therefore begin, but not end, with the use of the Hooghe-Marks classification.
4 
  The third basic assumption of the chapter, following the institutional analyses of 
Douglass North (1991) and others, is that institutional design--including the creation and  
                                                           
4 A final flaw of Hooghe’s and Marks’ categories is less important but deserves mention here. In their paper, 
Hooghe and Marks argue that the relationship between the national/supranational dimension and the right/left 
dimension is orthogonal, i.e. that those on the left prefer a supranational Europe, while those on the right 
prefer strictly national competences. In fact, however, we can usefully disaggregate supranationalism by issue-
area, so that neoliberals prefer supranational powers in market-making areas such as the internal market, trade, 
competition, and monetary policy, while proponents of regulated capitalism advocate supranational powers in 
areas such as social policy, industrial policy, employment, and environmental and consumer protection.  
  4amendment of the EU’s constitutive treaties--is not politically innocent, but rather facilitates 
or hinders the adoption of specific political programs. That is to say, as rational actors, the 
participants in the EU’s various intergovernmental conferences (including member 
governments, supranational organizations, and private interests lobbying from the outside) 
prefer and bargain for institutional configurations that are likely to facilitate the adoption of 
their substantive political programs, left or right.  The outcome of any given IGC, therefore, 
represents not only an advance or setback for the process of integration per se, but also for 
the projects of neoliberalism and regulated capitalism, respectively.  
  With these three assumptions in mind, this chapter examines the 1997 Treaty of 
Amsterdam, asking whether the new treaty represents an advance or a setback to the 
respective projects of neoliberalism or regulated capitalism. Before moving to the Treaty of 
Amsterdam, however, I begin by surveying, all too briefly, the three most important 
constitutive treaties in the history of the European Community/Union, namely the Treaties 
of Rome (1957), the Single European Act (1986), and the Maastricht Treaty (1992). The 
basic argument here is straightforward: From Rome to Maastricht, the fundamental thrust of 
the treaties has been neoliberal, in the sense that each of the Community’s constitutive 
treaties facilitated the creation of a unified European market, while setting considerable 
institutional barriers to the regulation of that same market. The Treaty of Rome, for 
example, featured important powers for the EEC in the areas of free movement, competition 
policy, and external trade policy, while granting the Community few powers of positive 
regulation and only a modestly redistributive Common Agricultural Policy. The Single 
European Act picked up this basic theme, focusing primarily on the completion of the 
internal market by 1992, and limiting institutional reforms largely to this goal. And the 
  5Maastricht Treaty focused primarily on the project for Economic and Monetary Union, 
which has turned out to be a neoliberal project in effect if not in its original conception.  
  The Treaties of Rome, the Single Act and Maastricht were not, of course, uniformly 
neoliberal documents. Because European treaties must necessarily be signed and ratified by 
all EU member states in order to take effect, reticent member states were in each case able to 
demand institutional reforms to facilitate the adoption of some elements of the regulated 
capitalism project, including both regulatory competences for the Union as well as 
redistributive transfers from some member states and regions to others. Hence, we shall also 
see that, accompanying the EU’s central neoliberal project, we also find a growing 
regulatory capacity for the Union across the three treaties, as well as a growing element of 
redistribution in the EU’s cohesion policy in the Single Act and Maastricht. 
  In this context of this institutional history, I argue, the Treaty of Amsterdam 
represents an outlier. By contrast with the earlier treaties, the Amsterdam Treaty features no 
central neoliberal project comparable to the common market, the internal market, or EMU, 
all of which are left essentially unchanged in the new Treaty. Rather, the Treaty of 
Amsterdam, which was negotiated by governments controlled overwhelmingly by the left 
and center-left, addresses many of the central issue-areas of the regulated capitalism project, 
including employment, social policy, women’s rights, human rights, the environment, and 
the powers of the European Parliament. Yet, if the Amsterdam Treaty represents a modest 
turn to the left in the EU’s institutional history, it does not represent the victory of Hooghe 
and Marks’ model of regulated capitalism, for two main reasons. First, in keeping with the 
critique of Hooghe and Marks offered above, the center-left majority at Amsterdam 
remained entirely silent on the subject of cohesion, which was put off for later negotiation as 
  6part of the Santer Commission’s Agenda 2000 exercise. Second, and for our purposes more 
importantly, the final negotiations leading up to Amsterdam revealed a split in the European 
left regarding its “project” for European integration. In the weeks prior to the Amsterdam 
European Council, a traditional socialist agenda for an interventionist, regulatory Europe 
championed by French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin collided with a new center-left project 
promoted by British Prime Minister Tony Blair which accepted the traditional socialist goals 
of employment and social welfare but was more skeptical of binding regulation and 
intervention at the European Union level. The final version of the Treaty, I argue, most 
closely reflects the new center-left program of Tony Blair, which seems likely to dominate 
the Union’s social agenda in the years to come. 
  The organization of the chapter is simple. In the next section, I analyze briefly the 
central provisions of the Rome Treaties, the Single European Act, and the Maastricht Treaty 
on European Union, assessing both the development of the Union’s neoliberal project and 
the regulatory and redistributive elements added to that project over time. The aim here is 
not to provide a detailed negotiating history of these treaties, which is far beyond the scope 
of the current chapter, but simply analyze these familiar treaties from the unfamiliar 
perspective of left and right. In the third section, I turn to the negotiation and content of the 
Amsterdam Treaty, analyzing the Treaty provisions in terms of Hooghe’s and Marks’ 
categories, and suggesting that the European project of the left has become more complex 
and fractured than the ideal-typical project of regulated capitalism put forward by Hooghe 
and Marks. Finally, in section four I conclude by characterizing Amsterdam as a “Blairite 
Treaty,” which reflects Blair’s effort to find a “third way” between the traditional projects of 
neoliberalism on the one hand and regulated capitalism on the other. Throughout the 
  7chapter, my primary aim is analytic, not causal: the aim of the chapter is to provide a 
theoretical lens through which to analyze the left-right implications of the EU’s constitutive 
Treaties, rather than a causal theory to explain these Treaties. I will nevertheless hazard a 
few tentative hypotheses to explain the weak left turn of the Amsterdam Treaty, focusing in 
particular on the unusual dominance of the left and center-left in the member governments 
of the Union in June of 1997. I begin, however, four decades earlier, with the Treaties of 
Rome. 
 
2. From Rome to Maastricht: A Neoliberal Project 
  Neoliberals and supporters of regulated capitalism advocate different institutional 
configurations for the European Union, in keeping with their substantive policy preferences. 
Thus, neoliberals have historically favored strong EU institutions only with regard to market 
liberalization, in areas such as the internal market, competition policy, external trade policy, 
and, since the triumph of monetarism in the 1980s, monetary policy. Outside of these areas, 
however, neoliberals advocate a minimal institutional agenda, placing strict limits on 
qualified majority voting and on supranational delegation in areas of social regulation. By 
contrast, proponents of regulated capitalism favor qualified majority voting and 
supranational delegation, particularly in areas of social regulation and cohesion policy. In 
terms of these criteria, I argue, the European treaties from Rome to Maastricht constitute, on 
balance, a neoliberal project. 
2.1 The Treaty of Rome and the triumph of free movement 
  To understand why, consider first the 1957 Treaties of Rome, which established the 
European Economic Community and Euratom, respectively. The Rome Treaties were signed 
  8during the golden age of the Keynesian welfare state, and were often portrayed by 
neofunctionalists as the result of a cross-class and cross-party consensus on economic issues 
in the Western Europe of the 1950s and 1960s (Lindberg 1963; Haas 1964). However, if we 
examine the historical record of the negotiations that produced the Treaties, we find a stark 
cleavage between the liberal advocates of free trade on the one hand, and the primarily 
French advocates of a less liberal, more regulated Europe on the other.  
  After the failure of the European Defense Community in 1954, European liberals 
generally rallied around a 1953 Dutch proposal for a European customs union among the 
Six, which was later revived as a project for a common market featuring free movement of 
goods, services, labor and capital as well as binding European rules for competition and a 
common external trade policy (Küsters 1987: 82). The supporters of this liberal view 
included the governments of the Benelux countries and Germany (with the exception of the 
liberal Economics Minister Ludwig Erhard, who advocated global free trade rather than a 
regional trading bloc); the Italian government, which strongly favored the proposed 
provisions regarding the free movement of labor; and finally a small group of liberal French 
ministers and officials in the center-left government of Guy Mollet, who served as Prime 
Minister from January 1956 through the signing of the Rome Treaty in March 1957.  
  By and large, however, the overwhelming majority of French officials and business 
elites were fervently opposed to the common market proposal. In the view of these French 
critics, French industry was simply unprepared for the competition that would accompany a 
common market, in particular because the social and fiscal charges on business were higher 
in France than in the other five states. In addition, critics of the common market also pointed 
out the potentially devastating effects of free trade on French agriculture, and the potential 
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In place of the common market, therefore, the French government advocated a new atomic 
energy community, or Euratom, which had been proposed by Jean Monnet as the 
centerpiece of a revived European integration process and which appealed to Paris as a way 
to spread the costs of nuclear research and development (Marjolin 1989: 281-297; Lynch 
1997: 169-78). 
  Thus, when Belgian Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak drafted a Benelux proposal 
for the relaunching of the European integration process in May 1955, he proposed a linkage 
between the common market (designed to appeal primarily to the liberal governments of the 
five) and Euratom (designed to appeal primarily to the French). This linkage was agreed to 
by the foreign ministers of the Six at the Messina Conference in June of 1955, despite the 
reluctance of the French delegation, and was maintained later in the meetings of the Spaak 
Committee and the subsequent intergovernmental conference, leading to the simultaneous 
signing in March of 1957 of two Treaties of Rome: the EEC Treaty and the Euratom Treaty, 
respectively.  
  Throughout these negotiations, the cleavage between market-oriented liberals and 
the dirigiste French establishment was once again dominant, especially over the terms of the 
common market. Indeed, the predominantly liberal French negotiators in Brussels, faced 
with hostility to the common market within the French bureaucracy and the National 
Assembly, were forced to demand a series of revisions to the report of the Spaak Committee, 
including most notably: a pause after the first stage of trade liberalization, after which a 
unanimous vote would be required to move onto the second and final stage; temporary 
safeguard measures for specific industries;  special arrangements providing explicit 
  10protection for agriculture in the common market; special arrangements for the French 
overseas territories; and most controversially, upward harmonization of social and fiscal 
regulations in order to mitigate or remove the competitive disadvantages which France 
suffered as a result of her domestic social regulations (Küsters 1987: 89-90). These 
demands, which would have severely compromised the common market, were summarily 
rejected by the other five member states in the negotiations, in which the French delegation 
eventually agreed to compromise on most of their demands. 
  Overall, the Treaties of Rome bear the imprint of the liberal vision. The central 
element of the Treaties is, of course, the common market, which is in essence and intent a 
liberal, market-making project. According to the terms of the Treaty, the common market 
would be an area characterized by the free movement of goods, services, labor and capital; 
moreover, the transition to the final stage of the common market, on 1 January 1969, was 
made automatic, and not subject to a further vote as the French government had originally 
demanded. In addition to this central element, the Treaty also included several flanking 
policies favored by the advocates of the liberal vision, including most notably competition 
and external trade policies. The provisions for competition policy are based on liberal, 
American-inspired views of anti-trust policy, and provide the Commission with some of its 
strongest supranational powers to police cartels and concentrations, abuse of dominant 
positions, and state aids to industry; for this reason, the competition policy laid out in the 
Treaty of Rome has been characterized aptly as “the first supranational policy” in EU 
history (McGowan and Wilks 1995). Finally, the Treaty also provides for a common 
external trade policy vis-à-vis the rest of the world, and authorizes the Commission to 
represent the common market countries in international trade negotiations. In short, the 
  11clearest, most automatic provisions of the Treaty, and those providing for the greatest 
supranational competences, are those which provide for the creation of a liberal, free-trading 
area with significant supranational powers in competition and external trade policy. 
  By contrast, the few elements of regulated capitalism present in the Treaty were 
inserted largely at the insistence of the French, and are weak and vague by comparison. 
Euratom was, of course, the great dirigiste counterpart to the common market, but turned 
out to be less significant than expected in the decades to follow. Within the EEC Treaty, the 
most striking exception to the liberal project was the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), 
reflecting the general conviction in all of the member states that agriculture would continue 
to be protected in the common market; yet the Treaty provisions on the CAP were left quite 
vague, leading to a string of political struggles between de Gaulle and the other five during 
the 1960s to secure permanent EC funding for French agriculture (de Menil 1977). The 
Treaty also included a French inspired Article 141 [119] on equal pay for men and women, 
which remained a dead letter until its activation by litigation in the late 1960s and 1970s 
[Hoskyns 1996].  
  Finally, in response to French concerns about competitive distortions caused by 
France’s advanced social regulations, the Treaty also includes provisions for the 
“harmonization” of national regulations, most notably in Articles 94 [100] and 308 [235]. 
Once again, however, these provisions for regulatory harmonization were watered down 
significantly from the original French proposals, in which successful harmonization of social 
regulations would be a prerequisite to the final, definitive stage of the common market. By 
contrast, the final draft of the EEC Treaty simply provides for the possibility of 
harmonization of social legislation, by a unanimous vote of the Council of Ministers. These 
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range of EC regulatory policies (Pollack 1994: 123-126). Nevertheless, the harmonization 
process proved in practice to be slow and inefficient, and a decade later John Pinder (1968) 
would note the difficulty of so-called “positive integration” in the EC by comparison with 
“negative integration,” or market liberalization. Indeed, by the mid -1980s the slowness of 
the harmonization process had led to a proliferation of non-tariff barriers which frustrated 
the market-making aims of the EEC Treaty. It was this situation that the Single European 
Act of 1987 was designed to address. 
2.2 The Single European Act and the primacy of the internal market 
  The literature on the Single European Act and the “1992" program is immense, and 
bears no repetition here (see e.g. Corbett 1987; Cowles 1993; De Ruyt 1986; Gazzo 1986; 
Moravcsik 1991; Pelkmans 1988). The centerpiece of the Single Act is, of course, the 
commitment to complete the internal market by the end of 1992, through the adoption of the 
300-odd Directives outlined in the Commission’s 1985 White Paper, “Completing the 
Internal Market” (Commission of the European Communities 1985). The 1992 program was, 
of course, a quintessentially neoliberal project, and was, in Moravcsik’s terms, the outcome 
of a long process of convergence among national preferences. Over the course of the 1980s, 
Moravcsik argues, the key member states of the Community--first Thatcher’s Britain, then 
Kohl’s Germany, and finally the post-Keynesian, post-1983 Mitterrand government in 
France--embraced the neoliberal goal of a single European market, which would provide 
Europe with the economies of scale necessary to compete against the rival economies of the 
United States and Japan (Moravcsik 1991). It was in this context of neoliberal consensus 
that Jacques Delors, the new President of the European Commission from 1 January 1985, 
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facilitate the rapid adoption of the Commission’s proposed Directives (Zysman and 
Sandholtz 1989; Cockfield 1995). 
  The Single Act itself is--at least by comparison with the later Maastricht and 
Amsterdam Treaties--a spare document, which faithfully reflects the aims of its neoliberal 
project. The heart of the Single Act can be found in Article 18 [8A], according to which:  
The Community shall adopt measures with the aim of progressively establishing the internal 
market over a period expiring on 31 December 1992...”  In order to facilitate the rapid 
adoption of the Commission’s proposed Directives, the Single Act also provided for limited 
institutional reform, most notably the adoption of qualified majority voting for internal 
market issues, and in particular the new Article 95 [100A], which provides for the Council 
to adopt, by qualified majority vote, “measures for the approximation of the provisions laid 
down by law, regulation or administrative action in the Member States which have as their 
object the establishment and functioning of the Internal Market.”  The decision rule of 
qualified majority voting is, of course, listed by Hooghe and Marks as one of the hallmarks 
of the regulated capitalism project; yet, as Moravcsik (1991) points out, the extension of 
qualified majority voting in the Single European Act is limited largely to the internal market 
provisions of the Treaty. The Single Act therefore gave Europe the institutional means to 
establish an internal market, but, as with the EEC Treaty, set a higher threshold for the 
adoption of social regulation within that market. 
  However, despite the overall neoliberal thrust of the Single Act, the requirement of 
unanimous agreement meant that certain aspects of the regulated capitalism project did 
make it into the text of the Single Act. For the sake of brevity, I focus here on three of these 
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enhanced the powers of the European Parliament by creating a cooperation procedure, 
which gave Parliament the right to propose amendments to EC legislation; these 
amendments, if accepted by the Commission, could then be adopted by the Council of 
Ministers by a qualified majority vote, but rejected only by unanimity. This new cooperation 
procedure, by enhancing the powers of the directly elected Parliament, was a clear step in 
the direction of the regulated capitalism model, but its scope was limited by the Treaty to 
internal market issues (De Ruyt 1986: 125-26). 
  A second aspect of the regulated capitalism project was the creation of new sectoral 
competences for environmental protection, worker health and safety, and research and 
technological development. These provisions gave the Community explicit competence to 
adopt Community-wide regulations which were not necessarily tied to the internal market, 
and to engage in a modest industrial policy aimed at encouraging cross-border R&D 
collaboration. Yet these provisions essentially codified policies that had previously been 
adopted on the basis of Articles 94 [100] (internal market) and 308 [235] (the Community’s 
“flexible clause”), rather than creating new policies de novo. Furthermore, most of these 
new competences remained subject to the old decision rules of unanimous voting and 
consultation, rather than QMV and cooperation with the European Parliament. A new 
Article 139 [118b], finally, was adopted to promote a “social dialogue” between employers 
and industry at the European level, but was rarely used prior to the Maastricht Treaty. 
Hence, only the provision in Article 138 [118a] for the adoption of worker health and safety 
regulations by qualified majority represented a significant advance in the Community’s 
regulatory capacity. 
  15  Third and finally, however, the Single European Act did take a major step toward the 
ideal of regulatory capitalism in its provisions for a Community “cohesion policy.”   
Economic and social cohesion was a crucial part of Delors’ vision for an espace organisé in 
which the wealthier member states and regions would demonstrate solidarity with the 
poorer, and Hooghe and Marks therefore include cohesion alongside regulation as part of 
their ideal type of regulated capitalism. Among the member states, however, the core 
cleavage on the issue of cohesion was not between left and right, but rather between the rich 
and poor member states of the Community. Thus, the key demandeurs in the negotiations 
were the Socialist government of Greece and the Christian Democratic government of Italy, 
which were supported by Ireland and by the incoming member states of Spain and Portugal. 
The demands of these states were resisted, however, by both the right- and the left-wing 
governments of northern Europe, which would become net contributors to any enlarged 
Structural Funds. In the end, the conference agreed on a series of five new articles for the 
Treaty (Articles 158-162 [130A-E]) which specified the general objective of economic and 
social cohesion, called for its integration into other Community policies, and codified the 
existence of the ERDF, which had hitherto been based on the catch-all Article 308 [235]. 
The new provisions also called for the comprehensive reform of the Structural Funds, to be 
decided by a unanimous vote of the Council on the basis of a Commission proposal to be 
submitted immediately after the entry into force of the Single Act. On the central issue of 
financing, however, the northern states resisted the demands of the south for an explicit 
commitment to greater expenditures, opting instead for a non-binding declaration according 
to which, “The financial resources of the funds... shall be substantially increased in real 
terms so far as funding possibilities allow.”  Subsequently, the size of the Structural Funds 
  16was doubled in February 1988, in a major intergovernmental bargain in which Spain and the 
other southern states linked the issue of structural financing  to the completion of the 
internal market program (Pollack 1995). Thus, cohesion emerged as the central element of 
the regulated capitalism project in the Single Act; but its core constituency among the 
member states consisted not in the European left, but rather in the poorer member states of 
the south, regardless of their political coloration. Indeed, it was the willingness of these 
southern member states to block the neoliberal objective of the internal market that gave 
them the leverage to demand major redistributive transfers--a pattern we shall see repeated 
at Maastricht. 
2.3 The Maastricht Treaty and the institutionalization of monetarism 
  Once again, the literature on the Maastricht Treaty is extraordinarily rich and 
detailed, and I will not attempt to summarize it here (see e.g. Cloos et al. 1993; Corbett 
1994; Duff et al. 1994; Grant 1994; Laursen and Vanhoonacker 1992; and Ross 1995). Put 
simply, the Maastricht Treaty encompassed the existing European Communities in the 
framework of a new European Union, in which the existing EC would constitute the first 
pillar, while the second and third pillars would involve intergovernmental cooperation in 
Common Foreign and Security Policy and Justice and Home Affairs, respectively. Within 
the EC pillar--which is our main concern in the context of the struggle between the 
neoliberal and regulated capitalism models--the central element of the Treaty was clearly the 
provision for a neoliberal Economic and Monetary Union informed by monetarist economic 
views and based on the model of the German Bundesbank. 
  In her recent book The Currency of Ideas, Kathleen R. McNamara (1998) argues that 
European monetary cooperation, culminating in the Maastricht provisions for EMU, can be 
  17explained in terms of “the historic economic policy convergence that occurred across the 
majority of Western European governments beginning in the mid-1970s and solidifying in 
the 1980s. A neoliberal policy consensus that elevated the pursuit of low inflation over 
growth or employment took hold among political elites, eventually resulting in a downward 
convergence in inflation rates,” and ultimately in the success of the European Monetary 
System and the decision to proceed at Maastricht with EMU. Furthermore, McNamara 
notes, this new policy consensus “is particularly notable because it occurred across most of 
the EU states, regardless of political party or institutional structure” (McNamara 1998: 3). 
McNamara explains this Europe-wide embrace of monetarism in terms of three factors. 
First, the experience of policy failure in the mid- to late-1970s  discredited traditional 
Keynesian policies and spurred the search for alternatives. Second, monetarist theory 
provided a new policy paradigm for governments seeking to control inflation, even at the 
expense of the Keynesian objective of full employment. Third and finally, Germany 
provided a model of successful macroeconomic policy based on the principles of 
monetarism, and hence “a powerful example to emulate” (McNamara 1998: 5-6). Taken 
together, McNamara argues, these three factors led European governments of the left and 
the right to embrace the tight monetary policies prescribed by monetarist theory, and thus 
provided the prior convergence in preferences which would allow the member states to 
accept at Maastricht a version of EMU informed by monetarist theory and modeled on the 
German Bundesbank.
5 In terms of the institutional history of the EU sketched above, the 
                                                           
5 For detailed analyses of the EMU provisions of the Treaty, see e.g. Eichenberg 1993; Sandholtz 1993; and 
Kenen 1995. 
  18Maastricht Treaty therefore represents the extension of the European neoliberal agenda from 
the internal market to the realm of economic and monetary policy. 
  Nevertheless, as with the EEC Treaty and the Single European Act, the Maastricht 
Treaty also includes a number of institutional changes and specific policy competences that 
reflect elements of the regulated capitalism project. In the area of institutional reform, for 
example, the Maastricht Treaty facilitates positive social regulation by expanding the use of 
qualified majority voting for areas outside the realm of internal market policy, including the 
environment, consumer protection, and a number of areas in social policy. Similarly, and 
again reflecting Hooghe’s and Marks’ ideal type of regulated capitalism, the Maastricht 
Treaty increased the powers of the European Parliament by extending the use of the 
cooperation procedure and creating a new codecision procedure which gives the Parliament  
 
veto power in areas such as the internal market, the environment, and consumer protection.  
  In terms of sectoral competences, the Maastricht Treaty created explicit EC 
competences for a number of new policy areas, including consumer protection, public 
health, education, and even culture (although the latter three areas specifically ruled out 
harmonization, opting instead for recommendations, coordination of national provisions, and 
modest financial “incentive” programs). By far the most important new competence in the 
negotiations, and the most controversial, was social policy, which had been largely absent 
from the EEC Treaty and had featured only indirectly in the Single European Act under the 
rubric of worker health and safety. The latter provisions had been extensively used since the 
entry into force of the Single Act, but in general the adoption of social regulations had 
lagged far behind internal market liberalization in the late 1980s, and so the Delors 
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adopt harmonized social regulations in a wide range of areas, mostly by qualified majority 
vote. These proposals led to a bitter debate between the Conservative UK government of 
John Major, which was the most neoliberal in orientation and opposed any provision for 
social policy in the Treaty, and the other eleven, which favored to varying degrees a social 
chapter with at least some qualified majority voting. This basic conflict led to a year-long, 
eleven-to-one deadlock in the political union IGC, and emerged as the single greatest 
obstacle to agreement at Maastricht. In an effort to break the deadlock, Dutch Prime 
Minister Ruud Lubbers proposed watering down the social chapter, but Major rejected this 
as well, telling his colleagues that: “Just as for you, signing this treaty without the social 
provisions creates problems, for me it is the other way round. I would not get the support of 
the British parliament or business” (quoted in Gardner 1991). 
  At this point, Delors came forward with the idea of an eleven-member “opt-in,” 
whereby all of the member states other than Britain would agree to a binding Social Protocol 
to the Treaty, under which the Eleven would adopt social regulations within the framework 
of the EC institutions but without British participation. This compromise proved acceptable 
to all twelve member states, and so a Social Protocol was added to the Treaty. Under the 
terms of the Protocol, the eleven signatories could adopt social policy provisions by 
qualified majority and in cooperation with the European Parliament in the following areas: 
improvement of the working environment; working conditions; information and consultation 
of workers; equality of job opportunities and treatment of work between men and women; 
and the integration of persons excluded from the labor market. In addition, the Protocol also 
allowed for harmonization in a number of other areas, including social security and social 
  20protection of workers; protection of workers where their contract is terminated; worker 
representation; conditions of employment for third-party nationals; and financial 
contributions for the promotion of employment and job creation. However, the Protocol 
expressly excluded pay, right of association, the right to strike and the right to impose lock-
outs from the scope of EC competence. Finally, the Protocol allowed for the possibility for 
European employers and unions to negotiate agreements directly through the social 
dialogue, subject to the approval of the Council of Ministers (Ross 1995: 191; Cloos 1993: 
307-15; Corbett 1994: 49-51; European Social Observatory 1993: 52-57). Thus, the 
Maastricht Social Protocol increased the regulatory capacity of the Union in social policy, 
but to varying degrees depending on voting rules, and excluding the United Kingdom.
6  
  Finally, at the insistence of the “poor four” member states, the 1991 
intergovernmental conference took up the issue of cohesion once again. The primary 
demandeur this time was Spain, which came to the IGC with a long list of cohesion-related 
demands, including an increase in the funding allocated to the Structural Funds; a revision 
of the Community’s own-resources system, which would better reflect each member states’ 
ability to pay; and the creation of a new “Interstate Compensation Fund” to help the less 
prosperous member states to meet the rigorous convergence criteria for EMU. Not 
surprisingly, Ibanez points out, “these ideas were not very well received in the Member 
States of northern Europe” (Ibanez 1992: 108). With the exception of a few minor changes 
to Articles 2 [2] and 158-162 [130A-E], all of the major Spanish demands were rejected by 
the northern net-contributors, and ignored in the draft Treaties prepared by the Luxembourg 
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  21and Dutch presidencies. Realizing, however, that their bargaining leverage would be 
greatest before the new Treaty was signed, Spanish Prime Minister Filipe Gonzalez and his 
European Affairs Minister Carlos Westendorp hardened their demands, and the cohesion 
issue was finally resolved at the Maastricht summit itself in a deal between Kohl (the largest 
net contributor) and Gonzalez (the largest net recipient). In the end, the Treaty provides for 
the creation of a new Cohesion Fund for the southern member states, provided that these 
states adopted national programs to meet the EMU convergence criteria laid down in the 
Treaty  
(Grant 1994: 200; Cloos 1993: 158). Thus the Maastricht Treaty, like the Single European 
Act, codified the European commitment to economic and social cohesion, and created a new 
instrument for financial redistribution. Once again, however, the successful coalition was 
not a coalition of the left, but a coalition of the poor, exploiting the interest of the northern 
member states in Economic and Monetary Union to secure a redistributive side-payment. In 
both treaties, cohesion was the price to be paid to pursue the neoliberal core project of the 
Union. 
 
3. The Treaty of Amsterdam 
  Summing up the previous section, the three major treaties in the history of the 
EC/EU demonstrate a clear trend. In each case, the Treaty is dominated by a neoliberal 
market-building or monetarist project, married to some regulatory or redistributive elements 
designed to secure the unanimous consent of reluctant member states. Nevertheless, the 
overall thrust of each Treaty, and of the European integration project, is strikingly 
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twelve member states.  
  In this context, the Amsterdam Treaty is an outlier. Unlike the Rome Treaties, the 
Single European Act and Maastricht, the 1996 intergovernmental conference was called not 
to advance any particular policy goal, but rather to review the provisions of the Maastricht 
Treaty five years on, and to reform the institutions of the Union in preparation for its 
impending enlargement to the east and south.
7 Thus, at the heart of the Treaty we find no 
central neoliberal element, but rather a mostly silent affirmation of the status quo on 
neoliberal issues such as the internal market, competition and trade policy, and EMU. By 
contrast, however, the Treaty records modest progress on many elements of the regulated 
capitalism project--except cohesion policy, which is not mentioned at all. Let us explore 
each of these elements in turn. 
3.1 Neoliberalism: The status quo preserved 
  If one examines the negotiating history of the 1996 intergovernmental conference–
available to an unprecedented degree on the Commission’s Europa website (Commission of 
the European Communities 1998) and in the pages of Agence Europe, European Report, and 
the Financial Times–the striking fact is that most of the most of the EU’s neoliberal acquis 
was kept off the negotiating table. The internal market provisions of the Treaty, for example, 
were scarcely discussed at the conference, and the only changes made were a modest 
extension of the Parliament’s co-decision powers to areas such as the right of establishment 
and the rules governing professions.  
  23  In the areas of competition and external trade policy, efforts were made early in the 
negotiations to amend the Treaty provisions in a more liberal direction, but these mostly 
failed. In competition policy, Germany in particular campaigned for the creation of a 
European Cartel Office (modeled on its own Bundeskartellamt) which would take over the 
Commission’s responsibilities in competition policy, and which would presumably be more 
stringent and less open to political pressures in the application of EC competition law 
(Wilks and McGowan 1995). These demands were, however, rejected early on by a number 
of other member states. In a similar vein, the Commission pressed for an amendment to 
Article 133 [113] on external trade policy, which would bring services and intellectual 
property issues within the realm of the EC’s common commercial policy and make them 
subject to qualified majority vote in the Council of Ministers. The effect of such a change 
would be not only to enlarge the Community’s legal competence, but also to remove 
national vetoes from these areas of trade policy, giving the Commission greater flexibility to 
negotiate liberal trade agreements with third countries. Once again, however, a majority of 
member states, led by France, rejected the Commission’s proposals, although the new 
Treaty does provide for a future incorporation of services and intellectual property into 
Article 133 [113], by a unanimous vote in the Council of Ministers (Petite 1997: III.2).   
  With regard to Economic and Monetary Union, finally, the conference made an 
extraordinary effort to keep the subject off the agenda entirely, lest the conference call the 
project or its deadline of 1 January 1999 into question; and indeed, the Treaty of Amsterdam 
is entirely silent on the question of EMU. Nevertheless, the subject of EMU was extensively 
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election of the new French Socialist government of Lionel Jospin two weeks earlier. Elected 
on wave of protest against EMU-induced austerity measures, Jospin and his economics 
minister Dominique Strauss-Kahn immediately denounced the German-inspired Stability 
Pact, which committed EMU members to fiscal austerity after the transition to the euro in 
1999, and insisted that the pact be renegotiated to stress the importance of growth and 
employment, and the need for an “economic government” alongside the new European 
Central Bank. German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, however, constrained by the Bundesbank 
and by a hostile German public opinion, resisted any renegotiation of the Stability Pact, as 
did most of the other member states. In the end, the Jospin government agreed at Amsterdam 
to sign the Stability Pact unaltered, in return for a non-binding Resolution on Growth and 
Employment, a proposed European summit on unemployment to be held the following 
November in Luxembourg, and finally an Employment Chapter written into the text of the 
Amsterdam Treaty itself (Vernet 1997).   
3.2  Regulated capitalism: Reforms at the margins 
  Thus, in spite of the last-minute electoral convulsions in France, the neoliberal core 
of the Union--centered around the internal market, EMU, and the flanking policies of 
competition and external trade--were left essentially untouched in Amsterdam.  But to what 
degree was this neoliberal project challenged by the competing vision of regulated 
capitalism?  Following the outline of the previous sections, in this section I examine the 
provisions and the negotiation of the Treaty of Amsterdam, beginning with the general 
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  25institutional reforms undertaken at Amsterdam, and then moving to the new and enlarged 
competences for the Union agreed in the Treaty. 
3.2.1  General institutional reforms   
  Institutional reform was, of course, the great weakness of the 1996 
intergovernmental conference, which failed in its attempt to reform EU institutions in 
preparation for the next enlargement to the east and south. Most notably, the conference 
failed to agree on the reweighting of votes in the Council of Ministers and on the size of the 
Commission in an enlarged EU, both of which will be the subject of a future IGC.  
  This highly publicized failure should not, however, obscure the significant 
institutional changes that were made by the Amsterdam Treaty, several of which advance 
the cause of the regulated capitalism project, in particular by strengthening the powers of the 
EU’s supranational organizations. The big winner of the Treaty in this regard was the 
European Parliament, whose legislative powers were increased substantially through the 
extension of the co-decision procedure to twenty-three new areas, including public health, 
the environment, equal opportunities and equal treatment, incentive measures for 
employment and combating social exclusion, and other areas of social policy. With the 
exception of the articles concerning EMU, which were left untouched, the cooperation 
procedure has now been eliminated entirely in favor of the co-decision procedure. The latter 
procedure, moreover, has been simplified through the removal of the Council’s so-called 
“third reading,” in which the Council could previously adopt by unanimous vote legislation 
which had been rejected by the Parliament. Thus, under the new Treaty, Parliament will 
participate as a co-equal legislator in most areas of substantive social regulation. In addition 
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Commission president (Petite 1997: IV.1). 
  The role of the Commission itself was “scarcely questioned at all in the Amsterdam 
discussions,” according to Petite (1997: IV.3) and the Treaty amendments in this area are 
minor, relating primarily to the “presidentialization” of the Commission, which will 
henceforth operate “under the political guidance of its President” (Article 219 [163]). The 
President will also have a role in selecting individual commissioners “by common accord” 
with the member governments, and is granted the right to reshuffle Commission portfolios. 
More generally, Petite points out, the Commission’s right of initiative is strengthened in 
several ways: by the creation of new Community competences, several of which feature 
qualified majority voting; by the incorporation of asylum, immigration and visa issues into 
the first pillar; and by the creation of a shared right of initiative between member states and 
the Commission for the remaining third pillar issues.  
  The European Court of Justice, whose powers had been assailed by the Conservative 
government of Prime Minister John Major early in the conference, in fact benefited from a 
grudging and complex expansion of its jurisdiction in the “communitarized” areas of 
asylum, immigration, and visas, and--subject to even greater restrictions--in the remaining 
third pillar issues. 
  Finally, with regard to the Council of Ministers, the IGC famously failed to agree 
upon any generalized move to qualified majority voting, largely because a weakened 
Chancellor Kohl was forced by domestic opposition to veto the extension of QMV to areas 
of Länder competence such as culture, industry and the professions. Even here, however, the 
situation is not entirely bleak, as QMV was accepted for new competences dealing with 
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employment and to combat social exclusion, and other issues relevant to the regulated 
capitalism project (Petite 1997: IV.2). It is to these specific competences that we now turn. 
 
 
3.2.2 Specific competences 
  In addition to the general institutional reforms mentioned above, the Amsterdam 
Treaty also introduces or expands Community competences in areas such as employment, 
social policy, equal opportunities, environmental protection, consumer protection, public 
health, and human rights. These new and enlarged competences, like the general 
institutional reforms reviewed above, move the Union in the direction of the project for 
regulated capitalism, yet the specific provisions and the negotiating history of the Treaty 
reveal a growing tension within the European left between the traditional socialist vision of 
a regulatory Europe, held most notably by the government of French Prime Minister Lionel 
Jospin, and the more market-oriented, center-left vision of British Prime Minister Tony 
Blair. To understand the nature of this tension, let us consider briefly a few of the provisions 
of the Treaty. 
  The issue of employment policy in Europe is, of course, a central question for the 
project of regulated capitalism, which might easily be expected to advocate a centralized, or 
at least centrally coordinated, policy to reduce unemployment. In this context, it is striking 
that the member states agreed unanimously on the inclusion of a new “Employment 
Chapter” in the Amsterdam Treaty, in line with the project of regulated capitalism. The idea 
for a new Employment Chapter had been broached early in the conference, in particular by 
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governments eager to demonstrate the Union’s attentiveness to the central concerns of their 
citizens. The election of the Jospin government in France, furthermore, gave the 
Employment Chapter an additional impetus, as it was clear that the French would make 
some movement on employment a precondition for the adoption of the Stability Pact; yet the 
content of the Employment Chapter was fundamentally contested not only between left- and 
right-wing governments, but within the left as well.  
  The pivotal figure in this debate was the new British Prime Minister, Tony Blair. 
Elected just a month before Jospin, on 1 May, Blair had immediately reversed a number of 
the long-standing neoliberal negotiating positions of the previous Conservative government, 
agreeing to negotiate new Treaty provisions on social policy, the environment, the powers of 
the European Parliament, and employment.
8 Indeed, the elections of Blair in May and Jospin 
in June signalled to many the ascendance in Europe of the political left, which now 
participated in government in a full 13 of 15 member governments, leaving only Kohl’s 
Germany and Aznar’s Spain controlled by the political right. 
  The diversity of views within the European left was revealed, however, at the 
meeting of socialist party leaders in Malmo, Sweden, from 5 to 7 June, just two weeks 
before the Amsterdam European Council. The meeting was the first foreign appearance for 
Jospin since his election, and in his speech Jospin attacked the neoliberal, monetarist thrust 
of European integration in recent years. “Market forces,” he argued, “if there is no attempt 
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  29to control them, will threaten our very idea of civilization” (quoted in Reuters 1997). France, 
according to Jospin, remained in favor of European integration. “But today, with high 
unemployment, low growth and increasing poverty, Europe can no longer be built on the  
back of its citizens,” he continued. More specifically, Jospin laid down a series of four 
demands regarding EMU. First, the Euro should not be overvalued against the dollar and the 
yen, which Jospin believed provided the United States and Japan with an advantage in 
export markets. Second, Jospin (supported by Jacques Delors, in attendance at the 
conference) demanded an “economic government” to coordinate economic, taxation and 
wage policies and provide a counter-balance to the European Central Bank. Third, Jospin 
called for the inclusion of Italy and Spain in the first stage of EMU, which would have the 
dual advantage of avoiding competitive devaluations by those countries as well as diluting 
the hard core of monetarist countries within the euro zone. Fourth and finally, Jospin 
demanded an explicit EU commitment to growth and employment, including the 
expenditure of EU funds to stimulate job creation (Bresson 1997; Marlowe 1997). 
  Blair’s message at Malmo, by contrast, represented a new, center-left agenda which 
stressed the fundamental principles of European social democracy, but differed on the 
details of policy and of institutional reform. Like Jospin, Blair argued that employment 
should be placed at the center of the EU agenda. “The most immediate challenge facing the 
Union is tackling unemployment--finding work and keeping work is a key priority for 
Europe’s citizens and making that happen must be a priority for the EU,” Blair wrote on the 
eve of the conference (quoted in Clare 1997). Yet the tone of Blair’s remarks was far less 
interventionist than Jospin’s. Indeed, in Malmo Blair lectured the other socialist leaders on 
the need for reform, telling them that, like the British Labor Party, European socialists must 
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center-left in Europe should adopt new policies emphasizing flexible labor markets, worker 
retraining, and a reformed welfare state. “Our task,” he argued, “is not to go on fighting old 
battles but to show that there is a third way, a way of marrying together an open competitive 
and successful economy with a just, decent and humane society” (quoted in Shrimsley 
1997). On the specific provisions of the draft Treaty, Blair indicated that he would accept an 
Employment Chapter and a Social Chapter in the Treaty, but only if these emphasized labor 
market flexibility and avoided over-regulation of the European labor market: 
We must make sure that in taking action to create jobs we do not do anything which 
would damage Europe’s competitiveness. To be unemployed because of a 
government’s good intentions does not make the situation any more pleasant. The 
risk that the employment chapter might backfire, putting in jeopardy more jobs than 
it creates, is not one that I am prepared to take (quoted in Clare 1997). 
 
Blair also rejected any additional expenditure of EU funds to deal with unemployment 
(Royle 1997). The difference in emphasis between Blair’s message and Jospin’s was stark. 
As Klaus Hänsch, former President of the European Parliament, put it: “European social 
democracy has to make a choice between Blair and Jospin, between new Labour and old 
socialism” (quoted in Barber 1997). 
  On the issue of employment, the member states opted for Blair’s version. The 
Employment Chapter agreed to in Amsterdam and incorporated into the Treaty (Articles 
125-130 [109n-109s]) formally makes “a high level of employment” an EU objective, and 
provides for coordination and monitoring of national employment policies, and the creation 
of an advisory committee on employment. However, at the summit the Blair and Kohl 
joined together to rule out any harmonization in the area of employment policy, and to block 
any major new EU spending on employment programs, which are restricted to pilot projects 
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9 In short, the new treaty provisions place employment clearly 
on the EU agenda, and require member states to account for their national employment 
strategies on an annual basis in a way that would have been unthinkable just a few years 
earlier; yet the approach is voluntaristic and falls short of granting the Union any significant 
regulatory or redistributive capacity. As one British government official commented after 
the Amsterdam European Council: “There is a very clear British stamp on the employment 
chapter and the summit conclusions. Flexible labour markets, welfare reform, the refusal to 
put more costs on business, these are very much on the agenda.... [Blair] does feel that there 
is an argument being engaged here and it’s one that he can win.”  Blair himself struck a 
similar tone in his assessment of Amsterdam: “The summit as a whole focused in a very, 
very important way on the issue of jobs and economic reform, the focus being on education, 
skills, flexible labor markets rather than old-style state intervention and regulation” (quoted 
in Smart and Coman 1997; emphasis added). 
  The Amsterdam provisions on social policy tell a similar story. The key issue here 
was the reform of the Maastricht Social Protocol, which the Commission had proposed 
incorporating into the body of the EC Treaty, with the support of the fourteen member states 
that had signed the Protocol. This initiative had been blocked by the Conservative 
government of John Major throughout most of the IGC, but soon after the British elections, 
Blair announced that the United Kingdom would agree to sign the Social Protocol, which 
was incorporated into the EC Treaty as Articles 136-143 [117-120] and thus became binding  
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  32on all the member states. As we have seen, however, Blair also argued at Malmo against 
over-regulation of the European economy, and on the eve of the Amsterdam European 
Council the British delegation indicated that it would oppose any extension of qualified 
majority voting under the Social Protocol, which was therefore incorporated into the EC 
Treaty without any changes in the Council voting rules (Helm and Jones 1997). The revised 
social chapter nevertheless contains a few moderate advances in the EC’s regulatory 
capacity, including an upgrading of the Parliament’s role to co-decision for all measures 
decided by qualified majority in the Council; an explicit reference to fundamental social 
rights (which are not, however, directly effective); and a new provision allowing the 
adoption, by qualified majority and with codecision, of incentive programs to combat social 
exclusion. Perhaps most significantly, the new Treaty includes a substantially revised 
Article 141 [119] reaffirming the principle of equal pay for equal work or “work of 
comparable value” (in line with the case law of the European Court) and providing for the 
adoption of legislation aimed at equal treatment and equal opportunities of men and women 
in the workplace, by qualified majority and with co-decision for the European Parliament. 
These provisions have been criticized by women’s rights advocates, who argue that the 
effect of the new Treaty provisions is limited to women as participants in the workplace, and 
does not guarantee equality between men and women more generally (see e.g. Commission 
of the European Communities 1997). Nevertheless, within the limited sphere of the 
workplace, the new Treaty provisions should facilitate the adoption of equal opportunities 
and equal treatment legislation in the future, and in this regard the new Article 141 [119], 
like the communitarization of the Social Protocol more generally, represents a modest 
increase in the regulatory capacity of the Union. 
  33  In addition to the core competences of employment and social policy, the provisions 
relating to the environment, consumer protection and public health were all the subject of 
modest revisions, strengthening the EU’s regulatory capacity to varying degrees. In the case 
of the environment, the major change was an alteration of Article 95 [100A], which now 
allows member states to introduce new environmental standards (rather than simply retain 
existing standards) stricter than those of Community legislation, on the basis of new 
scientific evidence. This new provision, inserted at the insistence of the northern European 
countries, instructs the Commission to examine these new national provisions and issue a 
ruling within six months; in the absence of such a ruling, the new national standard will be 
deemed to have been approved. In addition to this central provision, the IGC also agreed to 
strengthen the Parliament’s role in environmental policy from cooperation to co-decision; 
the Commission’s proposal to adopt qualified majority voting for all environmental 
legislation was, however, rejected. Finally, the language on sustainable development and the 
integration of the environment into other policies was strengthened as well (Europe 
Environment 1997). The result of these changes is not revolutionary, but the new Treaty will 
nevertheless allow the European Parliament a greater say in environmental regulation, and 
leave individual member states with greater leeway to adopt stricter standards after 
harmonization, both of which are in keeping with the agenda of regulated capitalism. 
  In the case of public health, the new Treaty calls for high standards to be adopted at 
the European level for human organs, blood and blood derivatives; it also provides for the 
use of the co-decision procedure in the case of veterinary and plant health measures for the 
direct purpose of public health protection, which had previously fallen under Article 37 [43] 
(consultation procedure). The changes in consumer protection are more modest, simply 
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information and education; by comparison with Maastricht, the Community’s regulatory 
competence is not significantly enhanced. 
  Finally, the Amsterdam Treaty substantially strengthens the Union’s commitment to 
human rights, in a number of ways. First, the Treaty empowers the European Court of 
Justice to review the actions of the Community institutions for respect of fundamental 
human rights. Second, in anticipation of EU enlargement to new member states with only 
short histories of human rights protection, the Treaty creates a new mechanism to penalize 
member states that persistently or seriously violate fundamental human rights; in particular, 
the Council may decide by a qualified majority vote to suspend the rights of a member state 
in violation. Third and finally, the Treaty includes a general non-discrimination clause 
which allows the Council to adopt, by unanimous vote and after consulting the European 
Parliament, legislation to outlaw discrimination on the basis of sex, racial or ethnic origin, 
religion or belief, disability, age and sexual orientation. This an extraordinarily broad 
statement of non-discrimination, going beyond the narrow labor-market provisions of 
Article 141[119] but the Treaty nevertheless stopped short of creating a directly effective 
right to non-discrimination that could be claimed by individuals and enforced in the courts, 
settling instead for a relatively demanding competence to legislate at the European level in 
the future (Petite 1997: I.1). 
  In sum, the Treaty of Amsterdam increases modestly the regulatory capacity of the 
Union in most of the key issue-areas of the regulated capitalism project, subject to the 
limitations imposed by Blair’s less interventionist approach to employment and social 
policy. The major exception to this trend is the issue of cohesion, on which the Treaty is 
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barely discussed in the 1996 IGC, for several reasons. First, most of the delegations, 
including the traditional demandeurs such as Spain and Greece, accepted that the real 
bargaining over the future of cohesion policy would occur in 1999, when the Union is 
scheduled to adopt the financial perspectives for the period 2000-2006. Second, by contrast 
with the Single European Act and the Maastricht Treaty, the Amsterdam Treaty contains no 
core neoliberal project, and hence no opportunity for the cohesion countries to demand 
redistributive side-payments from the wealthier member states in return for their agreement.  
More generally, the lack of any significant provisions on cohesion in the Amsterdam Treaty 
demonstrates that economic and social cohesion, while a central part of Delors’ intellectual 
project for an espace organisé, finds its constituency in the poor countries of southern 
Europe, regardless of their political coloration, and not in the political left. Hence, the left 
and center-left majority at Amsterdam embraced much of the project of regulated capitalism, 
but remained silent on the issue of cohesion. 
 
4. Conclusions 
  The European Union has implications for the left-right dimension of European 
political life. These implications can be theorized, in ideal-typical terms, as a struggle 
between the competing projects of neoliberalism and regulated capitalism. International 
treaties are not politically innocent in this struggle, but rather facilitate or hinder the 
adoption of these respective projects. In this context, I have argued that the core project of 
European integration from the EEC Treaty to the Maastricht Treaty has been neoliberal, 
focusing around the twin goals of the internal market and monetary integration. The Treaty 
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the object of consensus among the member governments, both left and right, of the 
European Union. As we have seen, however, the Amsterdam Treaty also went beyond the 
EU’s neoliberal core, adding to it a series of more or less significant changes in institutional 
provisions and sectoral competences, and moving the Union subtly to the left by comparison 
with the neoliberal thrust of the previous treaties. 
  How might we explain this leftward turn, however modest, in the Amsterdam 
Treaty?  Once again, the aim of this chapter is analytical rather than explanatory, and I do 
not intend to put forward a new theory of intergovernmental decision-making here. A 
thorough explanation of the outcome at Amsterdam would no doubt have to consider 
multiple factors, including the difficult experience of the Maastricht ratification debates, the 
economic context of high unemployment rates throughout Europe, and the accession in 1995 
of new member states with a long tradition of open government and social regulation. Taken 
together, such factors take us some way toward explaining the increased emphasis on issues 
perceived to be important to ordinary citizens, such as employment, social policy, the 
environment, and the free movement of persons.  
  Perhaps most importantly, however, the brief account of the 1996 intergovernmental 
conference offered above points clearly to the partisan composition of the governments at 
Amsterdam as an important causal factor in explaining the outcome of the conference. In 
June of 1997, an astounding 13 of the 15 EU governments included socialists or social-
democrats among the governing coalition, including the pivotal British, French and Italian 
governments; nine of these countries were led by socialist or social democratic prime 
ministers. Germany, moreover, was led by Helmut Kohl’s CDU, which, despite sniping 
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capitalism. In the context of the negotiating record of the conference, it seems clear that the 
emphasis on social issues in the Treaty can only be explained in terms of the last-minute 
victories of leftist governments in France and especially the United Kingdom, where the 
Blair government reversed long-standing British vetoes on key issues such as the Social 
Protocol, the Employment Chapter, environmental policy and the European Parliament. In 
Moravcsik's (1991) language, the preferences of EU member governments converged--by 
electoral mandate. The Treaty of Amsterdam was negotiated principally by governments of 
the left and center-left, and bears their imprint. 
  Yet the Treaty of Amsterdam does not represent the triumph of a traditional socialist 
or social democratic ideal of regulated capitalism. Rather, I have argued, the Treaty of 
Amsterdam, and in particular the key sections of the Treaty dealing with matters of 
employment and social policy, were shaped largely by the new government, and the new 
governing philosophy, of Tony Blair. As the leader of New Labour, and now as Prime 
Minister, Blair has accepted the central elements of the neoliberal status quo he inherited 
from Margaret Thatcher, seeking only modest regulatory and redistributive changes around 
the margins of Thatcher’s neoliberal legacy. Similarly, the Treaty of Amsterdam accepts and 
incorporates the fundamental neoliberal thrust of the earlier treaties, while superimposing on 
these treaties a number of provisions that indicate a commitment to traditional social 
democratic principles such as employment and social protection, without significantly 
increasing the ability of the Union to adopt binding European policies in these areas. 
  What, then, are we to make of this Blairite Treaty?  I see two possible 
interpretations. In the first interpretation, Blair--and by extension the Amsterdam Treaty, 
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swallowed the neoliberal prescription of free trade and monetarist economics, and offers 
only weak, symbolic Treaty provisions to address questions of employment and social 
policy without actually providing the Union with the institutional means to act in these 
areas. The second interpretation, most prominently offered by sociologist Anthony Giddens, 
is that Blair is in the process of defining a third way, a new radical politics “beyond left and 
right,” based not on state intervention and regulation but rather on preparing individuals to 
survive and prosper in the new global economy (Giddens 1994; 1996; 1997). It is, as yet, too 
early to judge whether Giddens’ interpretation holds water: Blair’s third way is as yet poorly 
defined, especially at the European level, and the Amsterdam Treaty has yet to enter into 
force. Yet, it remains an intriguing and ironic possibility that, just as scholars like Hix, 
Hooghe and Marks are exploring the left-right implications of European integration, 
centrists like Blair and Giddens claim to be transcending a left-right distinction that is too 
blunt, and too outdated, to serve as a guide to policy in the new global economy. 
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